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At a first pass, indexical expressions are usually defined by ostension of the 
prototypical members of the class: e.g., as "words like/, now, and here." I 
suppose that's appropriate. But a well-known problem with ostensive definitions is 
that they leave implicit the essential properties of the class. In the recent literature on 
indexicality we can discern two distinct understandings of what makes these 
expressions exceptional, one growing out of linguistic work on quantification and 
anaphora, the other out of philosophical accounts of reference. And although these 
writers have generally assumed that they are all talking about the same thing, I want 
to argue here that what people describe as "indexicality'' really involves two 
different phenomena. 
Indexicality and anaphora 
Recent theories of anaphora have generally made it an explicit goal to produce 
unified accounts of the various uses of pronouns and analogous devices.2 The 
object here is to assimilate the deictic uses of pronouns, as in an utterance like (1 ), 
to their uses as discourse anaphors and bound variables, as in (2) and (3). (rll use 
the symbol "11'.ii"" to indicate a demonstrative use of an expression): 
(1) Get a load of 11'.ii" her! 
(2) A woman entered. She sat down. 
(3) Every woman forgot her coat. 
To date, discussions of this question have been largely programmatic much 
more attention has been given to the anaphoric uses of pronouns than to their deictic 
uses.3 But the general strategy is clear: we will want to think of the context of 
utterance on the model of the other contexts that can control anaphors and related 
expressions; that is, the discourse model and quantifiers. 
One ancillary but important consequence of taking this point of view is that it 
leads us to define the class of indexicals in a broad way. As a various people have 
noted, the patterns of use exhibited by the pronouns in (1)-(3) are also found with 
temporal and locative items like tenses and the word there. And Mitchell (1986) and 
1 Thanks to Cleo Condoravdi, Mary Dalrymple, Mark Gawron, Fran,ois Recanati, and Annie 
Zaenen for comments and suggestions. 
2 Cf., eg.,Kamp (1984:6): "The analysis of pronominal anaphora I shall sketch is informed by the 
conviction that the mechanisms which govern deictic and anaphoric occurrences of pronouns are 
basically the same." 
3 One exception is Heim (ms), who argues that the theoretical apparatus developed within DRT 
accounts of anaphora can be invoked to explain some of the apparent semantic paradoxes that arise 
within direct-reference accounts of demonstratives. 
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Partee (1989) have noted that we see the same effects with a wide range of open-
class items like local, enemy,foreign, away, and so on, which behave as if they 
contained implicit pronoun-like variables. So a sentence like (4) can have three 
readings, depending on whether the occurrence of local is controlled by the 
utterance context, the subject, or the quantifier- that is, whether the athlete is local 
relative to the location of the speaker, the New York Times, or each of the reporters 
in question: 
(4) 	 The New York Times had every reporter cover a local athlete. 
Analogously, the phrase fifty miles away in (5) (from Partee) can be construed 
relative to either the utterance context or the context established by the quantifier:4 
(5) 	 Every man who stole a car abandoned it fifty miles away. 
Of course not all pronouns and analogous expressions display the same range 
of behavior as the third-person pronouns in (1)-(3). On the one hand, there are 
some expressions that can only be controlled by the context of utterance what we 
can think of as "dedicated indexicals." Partee gives (6) and (7) as a way of 
illustrating this point with/: 
(6) 	 ??Every speakeri has trouble stopping when Ii should. 
(7) 	 ??Every person in linei said that Ii had been waiting for more than an hour. 
That is,/ can't range over different speakers here. And (8) shows the impossibility 
of using tomorrow as a bound variable: 
(8) 	 Whenever Jane and I get into a fight I know she'll call to apologize 
tomorrow (ok the next day). 
4 As Partee observes, one important motivation for trying to assimilate these expressions to the 
uses of pronouns is lhat bolh types seem to be subje,.;t to the same kinds of syntactic constraints. 
For example, she points out that lhe relative acccp1ability of (i) and (ii) reflects a difference in c-
control: 
(i) 	 Every untenured professori in the slate re..:eivecl a letter from the leader of a localj union. 
(ii) 	 ?The leader of a locali union sent a letter to every untenured profcssoq in the Slate. 
And Jacobson (this volume) makes the same point with regard to the i-within-i condition, as 
demonstrated by (iii)-(vi): 
(iii) the womani who married heri childhood friend 
(iv) •the wifei of heq childhood friend 
(v) The mani who owns a locali bar can get a drink any tim~. 
(vi) •Toe owneq of a locali bar can get a drink any time. 
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The adjectives current and present show the same distinction. Both words can 
be used to pick out an interval surrounding the time of utterance, but only current 
can pick out an interval surrounding a reference time supplied by an explicit 
temporal operator: 
(9) 	 In 1978, the present/current president was a Democrat. 
With present, (9) says unambiguously that George Bush was a Democrat in 1978; 
with current it allows both that reading and a reading where it says that Jimmy 
Carter was a Democrat. 
At the other end of the scale, there are some anaphoric expressions that can't 
be controlled by the context of utterance. The best-known instances are third-person 
reflexives and the various constructions that Sag and Hankamer (1984) have 
described as "surface anaphors": VP ellipsis, sluicing and slifting, and so forth. But 
there are also lexical anaphors that are subject to this restriction, for example the 
fonner and the latter. These expressions are used discourse-anaphorically in (10) to 
mean roughly "the first-mentioned" and "the last-mentioned": 
(10) 	 Flynn came up to bat followed by Jimmy Blake; the former got a hit and the 
latter bunted safely. 
But if you are at a baseball game and somebody asks you who's already batted in 
the inning, you could not respond with (11): 
(11) 	 A: Who's been up in this inning? 
B: ??The former was Flynn and the latter was Blake. 
On the basis of observations like these, we must assume, with Partee, that the 
lexical entries for anaphors and anaphor-like expressions should include a 
specification of the particular kinds of contexts they can be controlled by. Thus/ 
and present will be lexically marked as permitting only control by the utterance 
context; the former and himself will be marked as permitting control only by 
discourse anaphors and quantifiers, and he and current will be marked as permitting 
control by any kind of context (or what is equivalent, these words will be unmarked 
with regard to this feature). These control properties are summarized in Table 1: 
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Table I: Summary of control propcnics  
utterance discourse or 
context quantifier 
col\lext 
I, tomorrow, here YES NO 
he, local YES YES 
1he former. himself ~o YES 
On this approach, then, to say that an expression is indexical is simply w say that 
its interprctation is either an element of the utterance context (e.g .. the time of 
speaking) or something that stands in a specified relation to such an element (e.g., 
the calendar day that follows the time of speaking}. lndexicaliry is sometimes a 
property of expression types (as v.·ith the word present) and sometimes a propeny 
of expression uses (as with the uses of the word current that are controlled by the 
context of utterance). 
Direct reference accounts 
In what follows, I'll use "indexical" in this relatively broad sense, to refer to 
expressions or uses of expressions whose interprel3tion is detem1ined relative to 
elemcms of the utterance contcxt.5 In the dircct-referencc theories developed by 
Kaplan, Perry, and others, however, the tem1 has generally been used in a more 
restricted way. On these accounts, what makes indexicals exceptional is not simply 
that their linguistic meanings make reference to recurrent features of the context of 
utterance (or that indexicals are token-reflexive or however this is put), but that 
these meanings don't figure as part of what is said by the utterances containing 
occurrences of the expressions. Thus the meanings of words like /, now, or here 
are functions from contexts (or from tokens or occurrences of expressions) to 
persons, times, or places; and once this function is evaluated for a particular 
utterance we throw away the meaning and take the thing it picks out as being the 
propositional component that corresponds to the expression. That is. indcxical 
utterances express singular propositions. This is what distinguishes indexicals like/ 
from the descriptions (eg. "the speaker of the utterance") that paraphrase their 
5 I say "relatively broad" because terms like index/cal and deictic are sometimes used in a very 
general way to include any expression whose interpretation is sensitive to foaturcs of the context of 
mtcrancc, including the beliefs or inlCr<:,sL, of conversational participanL,. Spraking in this way. 
one could say for example that the English genitive is indcxical, in the sense that we require 
contextual information to determine whether a phrase like John's book rcfors to the book that John 
owns, that John has written, and so forth, Of course this is a much broader understanding of the 
term than it has grncrally had in the recent phtlnsophical literature (though 1t is worth noting that 
Peirce sometimes used the word in a similarly loose way; at one point he suggest, that red is an 
indcxical since its meaning can only be learned by ostension). 
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linguistic meanings; hence the difference in truth-value between utterances like (12) 
and (13): 
(12) I am necessarily a speaker. 
(13) The speaker of this utterance is necessarily a speaker. 
For our purposes, it is important to bear in mind that the direct-reference story 
really involves two claims about indexical reference. The first is that the linguistic 
meaning of an indexical or the demonstration associated with a demonstrative 
doesn't figure as part of the content of the utterance. The second is that what an 
indexical contributes to the utterance content is the very individual that satisfies the 
linguistic meaning, or the very thing picked out by a demonstration. These claims 
are in principle distinct. The fact that an occurrence of an expression doesn't 
contribute the property associated with its linguistic meaning doesn't mean that it 
can't contribute some other property, after all. And in fact I'll argue in a moment 
that this sometimes happens. So for the moment I want to characterize the 
interpretive peculiarities of indexicals just in terms of the first pan of the claim, that 
their meanings aren't part of the utterance content. I'll describe this claim by saying 
that expressions like/ and that are indicative, rather than descriptive. And I will 
describe such indexicals as deictics. 6 
Two kinds of indexicality 
At this point, then, we will want to compare these two understandings of 
indexicality, and to ask whether they pick out the same class of expressions or uses 
of expressions. As we are using the terms here, that is, are all indexicals deictics? 
This question hasn't been much looked at, for several reasons. On the one hand, as 
I noted, linguists who have worked on anaphora and related topics haven't 
examined the indexical uses of pronouns in any detail. On the other hand, the 
philosophers who have developed the direct-reference approach have tended to 
concentrate on a handful of dedicated indexicals like/ and this, and haven't been 
particularly concerned with the linguistic issues that originally motivated the 
attempts to assimilate the various uses of pronouns. (For example, Kaplan suggests 
at a couple of points that the demonstrative and anaphoric uses of a form like he 
should be regarded as homonyms, a claim that most linguists would find 
unpalatable though I will wind up arguing that it contains a kernel of truth.)7 
In fact I want to argue here that indexicality involves two distinct phenomena, 
6 This usage isn't standard, of course. For the most part, the words index/cal and deictic are 
distinguished by provenance; philosophers tend to use the fonner, linguists the latter. Beyond that, 
writers have used both words in a variety of ways, though IO my knowledge, no one has used them 
contrastively before. 
7 "These words [personal pronouns] have uses different from those in which I am interested (or 
perhaps, depending on how you individuate words, we should say that they have homonyms in 
which I am not interested)." (Kaplan 1989:489) "... the fact that demonstrative and anaphoric 
pronouns are homonyms ... " (1989:589) 
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associated with different classes of expressions and expressions-uses. The first is 
deixis, which is associated with a particular class of indexicals - for example, 
words like 1 and tomorrow and demonstratives like this. As I suggested, deictics 
are inevitably indicative. The second phenomenon is what we can think of as 
"contextuality," where an expression pem1its control by the context of utterance, 
but where its meaning remains part of the utterance content.8 
I'll try to make this distinction more precise in a moment, but let me first give 
some empirical evidence for it. One way to tell deictics from contextuals is to look 
at how the expressions interact scopally with other operators. It's an important 
piece of evidence for direct-reference theories that the meanings of words like 1 
don't seem to participate in such interactions, since their meanings aren't part of the 
utterance content. So an utterance of ( 15) doesn't have the ambiguity associated 
with an utterance of (14): 
(14) 	 The speaker of this sentence could have been a contender. 
(15) 	 I could have been a contender. 
In ( 15) that is, we can only evaluate the meaning of1 relative to the actual context of 
utterance, and once we determine a value it's fixed for all possible circumstances. 
But note that contextuals like local do show such interactions. For example, 
suppose we're on a trip driving South across Texas, and we've been stopping 
every evening for Mexican food. At a certain point I say (16) (I'll use the subscript 
"c" to indicate a use of an expression that's controlled by the utterance context) 
(16) 	 The locale salsa is getting spicier. 
On the most likely reading, (16) means "In each place we stop, the salsa is spicier 
than it was at the last place." That is, we take local as falling within the scope of the 
progressive. In this regard local contrasts with the phrase around here in (17): 
(17) 	 The salsa around here is getting spicier. 
The only thing (17) can mean is that the salsa at the very place we've stopped is 
getting sp1c1er presumably we've been stopping over for a while. That is, the 
progressive can't take wide scope over the phrase around here.9 
8 Clark (1983) uses the term "contextual" in a broader way, to mean, roughly, expressions whose  
reference depends on the circumstances of utterance. As such, Clark's contexlUals include not only  
the subclass of indcxical expressions lam interested in here, such as local. but dcnominal verbs,  
noun-noun compounds, and so on.  
9 Examples like (i) and (ii) make the same point with regard to a modal operator:  
(i) 	 If I'd taken the reassignment, there'd have been a good local.: Chinese restaurant that we 
could go to tonight 
(ii) 	 If I'd taken the reassignment, there'd have been a good Chinese restaurant around here that 
we could go to tonight 
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We can make the same point by considering examples of VP ellipsis. 
Consider the exchange in (18), as spoken over the telephone between people in 
Palo Alto and Los Angeles: 
(18) 	 A (in Palo Alto): l\.Iy doctor lives a mile awaycfa mile from here. 
B (In Los Angeles): Mine does too. 
With a mile away, B's response can mean that his doctor lives in Los Angeles. That 
is, the content of a mile away can be abstracted and re-evaluated relative to B's 
place of utterance. But with a mile from here, B's utterance can only mean that his 
doctor lives in Palo Alto, too; the reference of here is bound to the location of the 
context of utterance. And (19) shows that we get the same distinction with current 
but not present: 
(19) Bush had been complaining about the currentc (??present) interest rates, 
just as Hoover did. 
That is, the content of current in the antecedent can be re-evaluated in the target 
clause relative to Hoover's situation, but the content of present cannot be. 
Deferred reference 
I'll come back to these examples shortly, but now I want to turn to another 
difference between deictics and comextuals, which involves the phenomenon of 
deferred reference. Here I have to give a bit of background. I said a moment ago 
that 1 wanted to take from the direct-reference account of indexicals as only the 
claim that deictics are indicative - that is, that their meanings do not figure as part 
of the utterance content - rather than the further claim that indexical utterances 
express singular propositions, in which the interpretation that corresponds to a use 
of an indexical is the very thing its linguistic meaning picks out of the context. My 
reason for this reservation is that standard accounts of deictic expressions have 
tended to ignore their use in the processes of deferred reference or deferred 
ostension. The crucial observation here is that the contextual element picked out by 
the linguistic meaning of a deictic or by a demonstration often serves as a pointer to 
the interpretation of the expression, rather than actually being the interpretation, For 
example, you can point at a newspaper copy and say: 
(20) 	 Murdoch bought llY' that for $50 million. 
In (i), we can evaluate local with regard to other possible circumstances, that is, relative to the 
reference point that would have been established by my utterance if the conditional were satisfied. 
Whereas in (ii) the reference of around here is permanently fixed relative to the actual point of 
uuerance, 
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And in this case you are most likely referring to the company that publishes the 
newspaper, rather than to the copy itself. Or you can point at the couch in John's 
new office and say (21): 
(21) 	 ILW' That has grown more imposing with each of John's promotions. 
The referent of the demonstratives in (21) is a kind-level individual each of whose 
stages is the unique couch that John has had in his office at any one time. Or take 
(22), where someone points at a picture of the Pope and says: 
(22) 	 ILW' He is usually an Italian. 
Here again, the referent is the kind-level individual each of whose stages is a person 
who is the Pope at a certain interval. 
Now we have to tell a fairly complicated story to explain just what kinds of 
correspondences can figure in determining the reference of deictics in cases like 
these. But one point that we should bear in mind is that the interpretations of 
deictics used in this way needn't necessarily be of the same type as the contextual 
element that the indexical picks out in particular, they needn't be individuals. A 
deictic can contribute a property, as well, provided the property corresponds in 
some salient way to the demonstratum or the element picked out by the linguistic 
meaning of the expression. For example, you can point at a sports car and say (23): 
(23) 	 ILW' That is what I've always wanted. 
An utterance of (23) needn't entail that the speaker has always wanted the very car 
he is pointing at; more likely it means that he has always wanted to own some car 
that has the properties that the demonstratum exemplifies. By the same token, 
suppose a condemned prisoner utters (24): 
(24) 	 I am traditionally allowed to order whatever I like for my last meal. 
It's unlikely that the pronoun here denotes the prisoner himself, since there is not 
likely to be a tradition that prescribes what that particular person can order for his 
last meal. Rather, this occurrence of/ has roughly the same interpretation as the 
description in a sentence like (25), which contributes the property of being a 
condemned prisoner: 
(25) 	 The (a) condemned prisoner is traditionally allowed to order whatever he 
likes for his last meal. 
Or consider example (26), as spoken by George Bush: 
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(26) 	 The Founders invested me with sole responsibility for appointing Supreme 
Court justices, 
Once again, we interpret the pronoun here as contributing the property of being 
president of the United States, rather than the individual George Bush. Of course 
the indexical is still indicative, since the property contributed by the indexical isn't 
the property associated with its linguistic meaning. That is, (26) doesn't mean the 
same as (27): 
(27) 	 The Founders invested the speaker of this sentence with sole responsibility 
for appointing Supreme Court justices. 
But at the same time the utterance expresses a general proposition. 
Now examples like these are reasonably familiar, but there is a tendency to 
think of them as involving a kind of derived or secondary reference that arises 
through a process of conversational implicature. ln that case we would say that the 
indexicals and demonstratives in these examples literally refer to the elements they 
pick out of the immediate context, and that these elements are then taken as standing 
in a kind of metonymy for their ultimate referents. But this line is hard to defend, 
for several reasons. ln the first place, note that in deferred reference the inflectional 
features of the pronoun or demonstrative - number, animacy, gender, and so forth 
are determined by the properties of the ultimate referent, not the contextual 
element or the demonstratum. For example if you want to identify a class of plates 
by pointing at a single demonstratum you use the plural those, as in (28): 
(28) 	 ~ Those are not in stock. 
And by the same token, when you point at a book to identify its author you use he 
or she, not that. This observation has a further wrinkle in Romance languages, 
where the gender of a demonstrative is determined by the grammatical gender of the 
name of the basic-level category that the demonstratum belongs to. If an Italian 
furrier wants to point at a mink (ii visone, m.) to identify the furs of the animal, he 
must use the feminine demonstrative quel/a (pl. quelle), since the word for "fur" (la 
pelliccia) is feminine: 
(29) 	 Quelle si vendono bene. "Those are selling well." 
So it's hard to see how we could assign these utterances a literal meaning where the 
indexical actually refers to the physical demonstratum; how can those denote a 
single plate, or the feminine plural quel/e denote a single mink? 
An even more immediate reason for rejecting a purely Gricean analysis of 
these uses is that deferred reference is not possible when a name or referentially 
used description is substituted for the indexicaL For example, suppose the 
condemned prisoner is called Darnay, and that he also happens to be the man who 
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is loved by Lucie Manette. Still, (30) can't have an interpretation where the subject 
contributes the property of being a condemned prisoner: 
(30) 	 Darnay (the who is loved by Lucie Manette) is traditionally allowed to order 
whatever he likes for his last meal. 
By the same token, (26) isn't paraphrased by (31): 
(31) 	 The Founders invested George Bush with sole responsibility for appointing 
Supreme Court justices. 
Both these examples can only have de re readings. But if the deferred readings in 
examples like (25) and (26) are derived pragmatically from a literal reading where 
the indexical refers directly to its contextual index, then this is puzzling. Whatever 
process generates the conversational implicature when the deictic is used should 
also be available to generate it when a name is used in its place. In either case we 
would be mapping from a singular proposition to a related general proposition. 10 
So the deferred use of deictics has to have an explicitly semantic license. And 
in fact the phenomenon is intimately connected to the indicativeness of these items. 
Direct-reference theorists are right to say that the function of the meanings of 
deictics and of demonstrations is to get us to a contextual element that provides die 
interpretation of an occurrence of the expression. But this element doesn't actually 
have to be the interpretation. Rather it can be a pointer to the interpretation; that is, 
an index in the Peircean sense of the term. In this sense the contextual element 
10 It might be argued that the difference between the readings here arises from a conversational 
implicature occasioned by the use of the proper name to identify somebody by name, the story 
would go, is to imply that his personal identity is somehow particularly relevant to the application 
of the property being predicated. I don't think this argument can be mamt.aincd, for tv.o rrasons, 
First, deferred reference is not available with referentially used descriptions, either, cYen though 
these function basically as demonstratives do; that is, they pick out something in terms of 
properties that arc simply contextually salient. So suppose we see John Paul II standing in the 
comer with a martini in his hand. I can say (i) but not (ii): 
(i) 	 He is usually an It.alian. 
(ii) 	 ?'/The man with the martini is usually an It.alian. 
But it would be hard to argue that the choice of the description the man with the martini has any 
particular relevance to the predication here; I've simply used that description l:xx:ausc it is a useful 
way of picking the referent out of the context. What's more, as we'll see below, deferred reference 
is not available with the anaphoric uses of pronouns: 
(iii) ?? A man came in wearing a red miter and speaking in a Polish accent. He was usually an 
It.alian. 
It is hard to see what kind of Gricean explanation could be offered here for the failure of deferred 
reference. Certainly the maxim of manner can't be invoked, since the mode of present.ation of the 
referent is the same here as in (i); i.e., both use the pronoun he. 
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picked out by a deictic is functionally analogous to the content of a description, 
rather than to its denotation. I I 
Deferred reference and contextuals 
For these reasons, we expect that deferred reference will be possible only 
with those indexicals that are indicative; i.e., with deictics. And this gives us a 
second criterion for sorting out deictics and contextuals. For example, suppose you 
are about to go to the south of France, and you want to know where to look for 
mushrooms. I take you to the bank of a stream in California and say (32): 
(32) 	 The best mushrooms are found around here (in this area). 
With either arou,ui here or in this area, (32) has a reading where it means something 
like "the best mushrooms are usually found near the bank of a stream." But this 
deferred reading isn't available with contextuals like locally or nearby, as in (33): 
(33) 	 The best mushrooms are found locallyc (nearbyc). 
If locally or nearby is given an indexical reading in (33) (that is, if the relevant 
location is fixed by the utterance context), then the utterance can only mean that the 
best mushrooms are found in the area surrounding the very place of speaking. 
Examples (34)-(35) make the same point about temporal indexicals. 
(34) 	 The crowds in the university bookstore have usually abated by a week from 
now (by tomorrow). 
(35) 	 ??The crowds in the university bookstore have usually abated soonc (in a 
whilec). 
As uttered on the first day of the quarter, (34) most likely means, "The crowds have 
usually abated a week after the first day of the quarter"; that is, now has a deferred 
reading, where it contributes a property exemplified by the actual time of speaking. 
But (35) has no such reading. Soon can only be interpreted as referring to a 
particular time shortly after the moment of speaking, and the reason (35) is odd is 
!hat this interpretation is inconsistent with the meaning of usually. 
Deictics and contextuals 
Table 2 summarizes the properties that distinguish deictics from contextuals: 
11 For an extended discussion of this point, see Nunberg (ms). 
Table 2: Differences between deictics and conrextuals 
deferred scopal interactions 
interpretations 
contextuals NO YES 
deictics YES NO 
At this point the obvious question is whether there is some independent semantic 
property that enables us to predict which expressions fall into which categories. At 
a first pass. we might expect that dcictics correspond to the class of dedicated 
indexicals; that is, expressions that are lexically restricted to indexical use. But this 
hypothesis is both too weak and too strong. It is too weak because we find deferred 
reference with third-person pronouns, which are the archetypal examples of 
expressions that can be controlled by all types of contexts. We already noted this in 
connection with example (22), where somebody points at a picture of the Pope and 
says He is usually an lra/ian. Or suppose we're at a party and see Ralph in friendly 
(;Onvcrsation with Clovis, apparently unaware that Clovis has been !;arrying on a 
dandestine affair with Ralph's wife. I point at Ralph and say: 
(36) n:.Jlr' He is always the last one to know. 
meaning something like, "The husband is always the last one to know." Tiiat is. the 
pronoun here contributes a property. So if we take the availability of deferred 
interpretations as (;ritcrial for the identifi(;ation of dcictics, and if we further assume 
that demonstrative and anaphoric uses of third-person pronouns do not involve 
homonymous forms, then we have to assume that deixis isn't restricted to dedicated 
indexicals. 
But there are some other observations that complicate this picture. As it turns 
out, the identification of deictic and indexical uses of third-person pronouns is not 
so straightforward as people generally assume. A (;fl!Cial feature of the uses of the 
pronouns in ca,es like (36) is that they are accompanied by explicit demonstrations. 
But these pronouns also have nondemonstrative indexieal uses, where they refer to 
a person who is simply salient in a particular background. For example, say we're 
walking through Versailles and you say: 
(37) Gee, he certainly spared no expense. 
The obvious reference here is Louis XIV. But Louis XIV isn't demonstrated here. 
either by the speaker or the context. He's simply salient in the consciousness of the 
conversational participants. And when pronouns are used in this way i.e., when 
they are simple contextuals - they can't have deferred readings. For example, take 
the situation of the triangle involving Ralph, Clovis, and Ralph's wife. But now, 
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instead of a situation where I point at Ralph, suppose we happen to be driving past 
Ralph's house late at night and we see Clovis leaving. I can easily say (38), where 
the pronoun refers to Ralph himself. 
(38) 	 He must be away. 
But I can't say (39), using the pronoun to refer to the role Ralph exemplifies: 
(39) 	 He is always the last one to know. 
That is, the use of he in (39) is indexical but not deictic, and hence no deferred 
interpretation is available. So in cases like (36) the deictic interpretation of the 
pronoun doesn't follow from its lexical meaning. Rather, it's the result of a kind of 
operator introduced by the demonstration. 
I'll have more to say about this operator in a bit, but first let me mention some 
of the consequences of this observation. For one thing, if the deictic feature of 
pronouns is introduced by an explicit demonstration, then we won't expect 
pronouns to have deferred interpretations when they are used as discourse anaphors 
or bound variables. And this seems to be right. For example, suppose we go to the 
opera and hear a mezzo singing a part that is usually sung by a coloratura. I can 
point at the singer and say: 
(40) 	 lv' She is usually a coloratura. 
where the pronoun refers to the role the singer is performing. But the pronoun in 
(41) can't refer to a role: 
(41) 	 ??Every mezzo has difficulty when she[= the role sung by the singer] is 
usually a coloratura. 
Analogously, the anaphorically used pronoun in (42) can't have an interpretation 
where it contributes the property of being president of the U.S., and the pronoun in 
(43) can't refer to the Pope as a kind-level individual: 
(42) 	 ??George Bush spoke next. He was invested by the Founders with the 
authority to appoint justices to the Supreme Court. 
(43) 	 ??The prelate who is addressing the U.N. is Polish, but he is usually 
Italian. 
On this analysis, we would predict that contextual pronouns i.e., 
nondeictic indexical pronouns can participate in scopal interactions with other 
operators, the way the word local does in an example like (16), The locale salsa is 
getting spicier. That is, their contexts of evaluation should be able to fall within the 
scope of other operators (in Kaplan's terms, these operators should should be 
"monsters"). So say A is showing B around a well-appointed campus building that 
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was donated by the wealthy alumnus Croesus O'Shea. They have the following 
exchange. 
(44) 	 A: The trustees certainly got a lot of money out of him. 
B: They always do. 
B's response here may be interpreted strictly (i.e., "The trustees always get a lot of 
money out of Croesus O'Shea"), but it can also have a sloppy reading, where it 
means roughly, "The trustees always get a lot of money out of the donors of 
buildings." In this case we have to be able to treat the relation between the pronoun 
and the context of utterance of the antecedent clause as available for abstraction and 
reinterpretation in the targer.12 (Note that this reading is not available if the pronoun 
is used deicticly for example, if (44) is uttered while demonstrating a statue of 
the donor. In that case the target clause can have only a strict reading.) Examples 
like this raise interesting problems for semantic theories of ellipsis, but I won't 
pursue this here. The point I want to make is simply that while these pronouns are 
obviously indexical, they aren't directly referential; their interpretations aren't fixed 
for all possible circumstances. 
With pronouns like he, then, we want to say that deictic interpretations are 
introduced by a demonstration associated with a use of the expression, rather than 
by a lexical feature associated with the lexical entry for the item, or even just with 
its indexical uses. At the same time, though, this operator can't be introduced freely 
with all contextual expressions or even with all pronouns. This is clear when we 
contrast the pronoun it with the demonstrative that. It can be used indexically to 
refer to some object that is salient in the context, as when you hand me a suitcase 
and I say: 
(45) 	 Gosh, it's heavy. 
But it can't be used as a demonstrative. For example, you can't point at one of the 
glasses of wine sitting before you at the table and say: 
(46) 	 ??Now lu? it's what I call a good burgundy. 
l2 We can make the same point with examples involving the use of they to refer to some vague 
institutional or social agency that is salient in the context. For example, suppose a Stanford 
professor and a Berkeley professor are talking about university budget cuts, and they have the 
exchange in (i): 
(i) 	 Stanford professor: I'm afraid they're going to start start cutting funds for RA's. 
Berkeley professor: I'm not. 
The Berkeley professor's response has a reading where she isn't disagreeing with what I.he Stanford 
professor is saying; that is, where she is talking about different university authorities. Once again, 
then, the interpretation of the pronoun in the antecedent has to be abstracted and reinterpreted 
relative to the larget. 
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And for just this reason, the pronoun it can't generally have a deferred reading. Say 
you're flipping through the stations on the television and a Giants game appears on 
the screen. I can say: 
(47) Don't switch, it's my favorite team. 
But now say that rather than the team itself, we see the face of Giants first baseman 
Will Clark, dressed in a coat and tie. In this case I can only get to the Giants via 
deferred reference, but an utterance like (47) with it won't permit this process. 
Instead I have to say (48), using the demonstrative that: 
(48) Don't switch, that's my favorite team.13 
(I should note that with forms like this and that we don't always require an explicit 
demonstration to get a deictic interpretation, since the deixis is built into the 
meaning element that distinguishes proximal and distal forms.) These examples 
show that it has to be lexically specified as not permitting deictic use, or in what 
amounts to more-or-less the same thing, that he must be lexically marked as 
permitting such use. 14 And this is a lexical feature that is independent of control 
propenies of these pronouns, both of which can be either indexicals or anaphors. 
This is why I said earlier that there was a kernel of truth in Kaplan's contention that 
the demonstrative and bound-variable uses of he were homonyms, except that the 
distinction should really be drawn between the deictic and nondeictic uses. I'm not 
saying that these are different forms, but the deictic use of he requires an explicit 
lexical license. 
With third-person pronouns and other contextual expressions that have both 
indexical and nonindexical uses, then, the availability of a deictic interpretation 
requires an independent lexical specification. But what about the dedicated 
indexicals? Can we at least say that these are always deictic? It's true most of them 
are - /, tomorrow, and so on. But there are some exceptions, which show that this 
connection too is contingent. For example, the postposition ago can only be 
controlled by the utterance context, as demonstrated by ( 49): 
13 Or suppose we drive pas! a car that has just hit a tree, in circumstances where !he accident 
manifestly has both our attention. I can say (i) but not (ii), where the intended reference is to an 
accident-type: 
(i) Gosh, it must have happened just a second ago. 
(ii) ??It (ok that) has happened a number of times on this stretch of highway. 
14 Note that !he plural they permits deictic use when it refers to animates, but not when it refers to 
inanimates (i.e., when it is !he plural of it). Examples involving deferred reference make !his clear. 
You can point at a record and say "They are playing a concen next week." But a salesperson in a 
record shop can't point at a picture of a singer and say, "They are defective," to refer to a shipment 
of records by that singer, !hough "Those are defective" works here. 
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(49) 	 ??Every writer who visited Paris in the 1930s wished he'd been there ten 
years ago (ok: before). 
But ago doesn't license deferred use, as (50) and (51) show: 
(50) 	 When I was a kid, they began to decorate the trees a week before now 
(before today, etc.). 
(51) 	 ??When I was a kid, they began to decorate the trees a week ago. 
In (50), a week before now is roughly equivalent to a description like "a week 
before December 15," or whatever date the sentence is uttered on - thar is, the 
indexical contributes a property that is exemplified by the time of utterance. But in 
(51), ago can't have this reading, which entails that ago is not a deictic. So we have 
to conclude that even where deixis is a provided by lexical feature rather than a 
demonstration, it has to be specified independently of the restrictions on control that 
limit an item like ago to indexical use. 
It follows that the lexicon has to make provision for three types of indexical 
expressions: those that are invariably deictic, like/; those that cannot be deictic. like 
it-, and those that permit but don't require deictic use, like he. This is summarized in 
Table 3: 
Table 3: Lexical spe('.ification of deixis 
I, tomorrow +DEICTIC 
it, local, ago ~DEICTIC 
he ±DEICTIC 
In the end, then, the two approaches to indexicality that we began with yield 
largely disjoint definitions of the phenomenon. I don't think we should find this 
surprising. No one has ever offered a theoretical reason why there should he an 
absolute correlation between expressions which have indexical meanings (i.e., 
which are token-reflexive, controlled by the utterance context, or whatever) and 
expressions with the particular interpretive properties associated with direct 
reference (i.e., indicativeness). This was always an unexplained empirit:al 
assumption, and it simply turns out to be false. 15 
15 Note that on this account the interpretive properties of deictics are different from those of proper 
names, though the two are conflated on most direct-reference accounts. I would argue that unlike 
indcxicals, proper names are indicative in virtue of the kind~ of linguistic mies that determine their 
use; i.e., to be a proper name is 10 directly denote an individual. But proper names are not like 
deictics in that their conventional denotations can't serve as Peircean indices of their 
interpretations; that is, they don't permit deferred r~fercnce. 
299 
Deixis and Interpretation 
Let me conclude by saying a bit more about the interpretations of deictics. On 
the account I'm offering here, deixis involves an operator that is a lot like Kaplan's 
Dthat; it takes contexts, tokens, or whatever into elements of the context. The 
difference is that here we want to make explicit semantic provision here for deferred 
reference. One way of accommodating this is to have the semantics constrnincd by a 
context-sensitive "deference function," which composes with the deixis operator to 
pnxluce an interpretation. Sag (1981) proposed something along these lines in an 
cffon to formalize some of these observations about deferred reference. But Sag 
made this function part of the content of the expression, whereas I prefer to think of 
it as a kind of constraint on the relation between the context and the content. Take 
for example the case of pointing at a newspaper to identify its publisher. Let 8 be 
the demonstratum, and let Fe be the deference function that is relevant in the 
context; here, the function from newspaper copies to their publishers. Then we can 
represent the interpretation of a sentence like Murdoch bought that as something like 
(52): 
(52) Bought-for-$50-millon (~urdoch, z), where z (8) 
Now if deference functions were limited to functions that returned 
individuals, this wouldn't have any imponant effect on the direct-reference story. 
since these utterances would still express singular propositions. But we've seen that 
deictics can also have other kinds of interpretations. They can contribute kinds, 
propenies, and so fonh. And this raises the question of how these interpretations 
should be represented and what becomes of the direct·reference approach when we 
extend the at:count 10 cover these cases. 
Note also that the account of deixis I've offered here doesn'L explain why only indcxicals 
should permit de1(:1t(: niadings why shouldn't deixis (ancl hence deferred rdcrcn(e) be available 
with the uses of names and referentially used descriptions as we IP In fact there are examples that 
suggest this is possible. Say W( .. r,· wa11:hing a televised Senate debate: I point al Dan Quayle, the 
presiding officer, and ;;;iy: 
(1\ Dan Quayle over there (the blond f'eathcrhead over there) might haw b<,cn a Democrat. 
Ami (i) has a reading where it means nmghtly "The presiding officer or the Senate might have ix'<'n 
a Dcmocrnt"; that is, the proper name rnntribut.cs a property. This example needs more discussion 
than I can give it here. but I shoulcl make two poinL~. First, thcr,· arc a number of reasons for 
believing that t11c dckrrcd intcrpreumon here, unlike t11a1 with de1ctics like I. is derived via a kind 
of se.:ondary or reference, and nc,.xln't be provided for semantically. Second, it is notable that the 
interpretation here is limited to properties that Dan Quayle saliently exemplifies in lhc context. 
Yhc subject of (i) can't have the interpretation, "lhe chair of the council on competitiveness," say, 
even though Dan Quayk is known 01 have that property as well. ln effect, the interpretation is 
limited 10 propatics that can be physically demonstrated. l 1hink this observation is relevant to 
explaining the general restriction of dcixis to indcxicals, but I will not pursue this hrn:. 
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Interestingly, I think the basic insight survives intact. For example, suppose 
we take an example based on (26). You point at George Bush and you say: 
(53) n:J? He was invested by the Founders with the authority to appoint 
Supreme Court Justices. 
The pronoun here contributes something like the property of being the president. 
But we don't want to mention a particular property in the representation, since it's 
not clear whether the speaker would produce that very description, or if he even 
knows exactly what properties are relevant. What (53) says, rather, is something 
like, "Whoever has the relevant property that the demonstratum corresponds to was 
invested by the Founders with the authority to appoint Supreme Court Justices." 
But it's important to note here that the interpretation in these cases is limited to 
properties that the demonstratum actually exemplifies. So you could not say (54) or 
(55) while demonstrating Michael Dukakis: 
(54). n:J? He could have been invested by the Founders with the authority to 
appoint Supreme Court Justices .. 
(55) n:J? He could have been traditionally the titular head of his party. 
That is, we can't evaluate the deference function relative to some other possible 
context in which Dukakis had been elected president. So while it's true that a 
utterance like (53) expresses a general proposition, there's still a sense in which the 
pronoun is "directly referential." We evaluate the deference function relative to the 
actual context, and once its value has been determined as a particular property, that 
property is fixed for all circumstances. Accordingly, we could represent the 
interpretation of the pronoun in (53) using a free property variable, as in (56); here 
again Fe represents a contextually determined deference function, but in this case 
one that takes individuals into properties: 
(56) t..P [Vx [TI(x) ~ Px], where TI= Fc(O) 
As in example (52), then, the relation between the interpretation and the 
demonstratum is treated as a constraint that relates the context to utterance content. 
The observations I've offered here raise a number of questions for theories of 
indexicality. For example, how exactly do demonstrations fit into this picture, and 
how can we assimilate the demonstrative uses of pronouns to the uses of indexicals 
like I? At the same time, we will want to know how to accommodate these 
observations within standard accounts of anaphor, such as DRT: do they entail that 
there are really two kinds of "discourse entities" by which indexical expressions can 
be controlled? I think the answer is yes, but I won't argue the point here. But the 
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